Michigan Law Review
Volume 104

Issue 6

2006

Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present
Edward K. Cheng
Brooklyn Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Science and Technology Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387
(2006).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol104/iss6/7

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

SAME OLD, SAME OLD: SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE PAST AND PRESENT
Edward K. Cheng

*

LAWS OF M EN AND LAWS OF NATURE: TH E HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND A MERICA. By Tai Golan. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press. 2004. Pp. vii, 325. $49.95 .
For over twenty years, and particularly since the Supreme Court's

'
Daubert decision in 1993, much ink has been spilled debating the problem
of scientific evidence in the courts. Are jurors or, in the alternative, judges
qualified to assess scientific reliability? Do courts really need to be con
cerned about

"junk science"? What

mechanisms

can promote better

decisionmaking in scientific cases? Even a cursory scan of the literature
shows the recent explosion of interest in these issues, precipitating new
treatises, hundreds of articles, and countless conferences for judges, practi
tioners, and academics.
To this literature, Professor Tal Golan2 adds Laws of Men and Laws of
Nature, a welcome and much-needed book-length work on the history of
scientific evidence. The book, which derives from Golan's doctoral disserta
tion, can be roughly divided into two principal parts: The lion's share
concentrates on nineteenth-century developments in England and the United
States, often in the context of business-related civil litigation. The remainder
looks at fin de siecle America, more narrowly focusing on the relationship
between the legal system and three then-emerging technologies: blood mi
croscopy, x-rays, and lie detectors. An epilogue attempts to tie these
historical discussions to the modern day Frye-Daubert debates, but it is
largely an afterthought and is appropriately separated as such.
Perhaps most salient among the book's goals is Golan's aspiration to
bridge the divide between legal history and history of science by revealing a
deeply symbiotic relationship between scientists and courts in the nineteenth
century (pp. 1-2). As to Golan's success on this score, being a scientific
evidence person as opposed to a historian, I defer to more qualified

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D. 2001, Harvard; M.Sc. (Informa
tion Systems) 1998, London School of Economics; B.S.E. 1997, Princeton. -Ed. I would like to
thank Jennifer Mnookin, Paul Schwartz, Margaret Berger, Jenny Diamond Cheng, and Tai Golan for
helpful thoughts and conversations. Cathy Altier provided superb research assistance. Generous
support was provided by the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy and the Brooklyn
Law School Dean's Summer Research Fund.
I. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (establishing a multi
factor test for assessing scientific reliability and tasking the judge with a "gatekeeping" role).

2.

Professor of History, University of California, San Diego.

1 3 87

Michigan Law Review

1388

[Vol.104:1387

3
colleagues. Instead, I would like to focus on Golan' s other stated goal of
providing historical context to the modem scientific evidence debates (p. 3).
In this respect, the book performs a valuable service for modem reformers.
After all , we have a natural tendency to think of scientific evidence
problems as new: Daubert certainly is new; toxic torts are new; and
"science" writ large perpetually seems new. But, as the accounts from Laws
of Men and Laws of Nature emphatically remind us, the problem of
scientific evidence is profoundly old (p. 4).
My chief regret is that Golan's treatment on this score fails to trace the
problems and solutions of scientific evidence in any significant detail be
yond the early 1900s. This is surely an unfair criticism, especially given his
primary historiographic goal, but the modem field of scientific evidence
could have really benefited from an unbroken account to the present. In
deed, if we supplement and update Golan's discussion-as I hope to do in a
limited way in this Review-we quickly see that the problems and proposed
solutions are not just old but also frustratingly recurring.
A. Folkes v. Chadd
4
Laws of Men and Laws of Nature opens with Folkes v. Chadd ( 1783),
scientific evidence 's origin tale of sorts. According to legend, in an epic act
of judicial creation, Lord Mansfield approved and set in motion the modem
system of adversarial experts (pp. 6, 4 1-44). As Golan skillfully demon
strates through a detailed reconstruction of the case, however, like most
origin tales, the Folkes fable turns out to be overly simplistic and triumphal
ist (p. 44). Lord Mansfield, it appears, couldn't have cared less about
"inaugurating a new practice of calling experts as partisan witnesses" (pp.
6-7). That dubious distinction apparently belongs to no one person but in
stead to the gradual accretion of adversarialism and party control in the face
of an oddly complacent and perhaps overconfident e ighteenth-century Eng
lish judiciary (pp. 50-5 1 ).
Blame issues aside, Golan's account of Folkes provides a look into late
eighteenth-century litigation that is fascinating not for its curiosities but
rather for its parallels to modem cases. Indeed, it seems that the broader
theoretical questions that shadow scientific evidence cases and commenta
tors today were present from the very beginning.
The setting for the Folkes drama was Wells Harbor, a natural harbor sur
rounded by low-lying salt marshes in northeastern England. Human
ingenuity (or hubris) being what it is, locals began draining the fertile
marshland for agricultural use, counteracting the natural tidal flooding by
constructing embankments. At the same time, the venerable harbor began

3.
E.g. Jennifer L. Mnook.in, Science at the Bar, AM. Sci., Nov.-Dec. 2004 , at x (reviewing
laws of Men and laws of Nature).
4.

P. 6 n.2 (citing 3 SYLVESTER DOUGLAS, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH IN THE 'fwENTY-SECOND, 'fwENTY-THIRD, TwENTY-FOURTH
AND TwENTY-FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GEORGE

III 160 (1831)).

May 2006]

Same Old, Same Old

1389

silting up, threatening the shipping industry (p. 9). The harbor commission
ers, of course, blamed the developers and their embankments. The
landowners responded that the silting would have happened anyway (p. 22).
A scientific battle royale was thus set .
Just as they do today, the parties brought i n their expert-champions. The
harbor commissioners primarily relied on evidence that was anecdotal and
experience based. Their parade of witnesses recounted the "rapid deteriora
tion" of the harbor after the embankment's construction (p. 37). The
commissioners also retained a group of distinguished civil engineers, "prac
tical men of science, skilled practitioners," whose expertise came from their
extensive experience and practice (pp. 26, 32). In contrast, the landowners
turned to "scientists" as the term is understood today. Their star witness,
John Smeaton, was a preeminent, well-published scientist, a member of the
Royal Society, and a natural philosopher who believed that phenomena
could be best explained by applying scientific principles (pp. 25, 30-31).
The Folkes court thereby immediately confronted two fundamental is
sues that are still widely debated in scientific evidence circles. As an initial
matter, should a court decide among competing scientific methodologies?
The judges in Folkes exhibited the classic split. Chief Justice Gould in the
lower court had no trouble excluding a witness who failed to measure up to
standard (p. 39). Lord Mansfield, however, reversed. Unwilling to choose
favorites, Mansfield left the decision up to the jury (p. 45). As Golan hints in
his analysis, this Gould versus Mansfield debate is akin to the Hatfields and
the McCoys. The "Goulds," like the Supreme Court in Daubert, find com
fort in judicial gatekeeping against unreliable or "junk" expertise. The
"Mansfields" maintain a more ecumenical view (p. 49).
Presuming a gatekeeping role, courts then face the intractable question
of what exactly constitutes good science. Modern scholars will recognize
the two archetypal experts in Folkes: those who reason from anecdote and
experience and those who reason from scientific principles. In a strange re
versal of fortune, however, in Folkes, it was the scientist who was on the
chopping block. A seemingly crabbed adherent to traditional experience
based expertise, Gould excluded the scientist's theories for being speculative
and not based on direct observation (pp. 39 44). On appeal, Mansfield in
retrospect played the role of luminary, the progressive who gave the emerg
ing science based in natural philosophy a chance . Two hundred years later,
Daubert has come full circle, but with a twist. Today, with science safely
seated on its throne, Daubert offers the opportunity of eliminating experi
ence-driven expertise from the courtroom, as a number of commentators
5
have advocated for handwriting and fingerprint analysis and the like. One
wonders if Mansfield would have been delighted or appalled.
,

5. See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science"
ls Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 624-25 (2002) (questioning the use of fingerprinting in light of
the method's untested assumptions); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Non
science in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 lowA L. REV. 21, 35,
39, 64-65 (1996) (questioning handwriting analysis).
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B . Biased Experts and Conflicting Testimony
To the modern observer, the elephant in the Folkes room is the problem
of hired guns. Adversarial experts, after all, are routinely accused of distort
ing science in their parties' favor. As Golan notes, however, Lor d Mansfield
makes no mention of the problem in his opinion. Judicial myopia is
unlikely-the common law of evidence obsessed over and routinely dis
qualified interested witnesses (p. 50). Golan offers an alternative, cultural
explanation. Eighteenth-century English scientists were bound by gentle
manly codes of honor that closely tied social status to credibility and
reputation (p. 50). Bias was therefore no concern at all, because the royal
judges could trust men of science to provide unbiased, truthful opinions in
court (p. 5 1).
This assumption, of course, was sheer folly. In nearly no time at all, courts
faced "a continuous parade of leading men of science zealously contradicting
each other from the witness stand" (p. 54). In a chapter appropriately entitled
6
"The Common Liar, the Damned Liar, and the Scientific Expert," Golan
shows this phenomenon plaguing early nineteenth-century English courts.
Was a new sugar-refining process dangerously prone to explosions? One
group of prestigious experts swore it was; predictably, another swore it was
not (p. 56). Did a copper-smelting operation create acid rain and destroy
crops? Proponents testified it did; some opponents remarkably characterized
the acid as "a blessing, a shield against cholera and other diseases" (p. 74).
Pollution emanating from alum works, contaminated well water, even the
scope of the prized magenta dye patent and the definition of "coal"-all of the
cases suffered the "familiar spectacle of two parties presenting flatly contra
dictory scientific evidence" (pp. 78, 80- 8 1, 85, 9 1).
Of course, scientists can reasonably disagree on occasion, even estab
lishing two respectable schools of thought. But judges are no fools, and, as
Golan describes, they quickly grew suspicious (p. 89). Either the scientists
were dishonest, or they were helpless against clever manipulation by the
7
attorneys. In any event, the experts were certainly not helping to resolve
any cases. Juries were "bewildered, perplexed, and left in despair as to
knowing how to decide" (p. 87). Judges became increasingly frustrated and
"disgust[ed] at the partisanship" of the witnesses (p. 62).
Golan grimly notes that the conflicting testimony problem was not lim
ited to civil litigation but spread to the criminal context as well (pp. 96-97).
Two poison trials illustrate his point, although their "Crimes of the Century"
status leaves one to wonder if they are representative-remember, in O .J.
Simpson's trial, even DNA was made to look unclear. The exemplars never
theless serve their purpose: in one case, the defense expert even bragged to
friends that he thought the victim had been poisoned but that " [the prosecu6. See also p. 255 (quoting Judge William Foster at the New Hampshire Medical Society
annual meeting in 1897: "There are three kinds of liars: the common liar, the damned liar, and the
scientific expert.").
7. Pp. 54, 105. Even the mighty Michael Faraday, father of electromagnetism, apparently
was ensnared by plaintiff's counsel. P. 67.
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tion expert] did not know how to find it" (p. 99). T he Attorney General and
the Lord Chief Justice (and in tum, the public) were predictably not amused
(p. 100). By the 1 860s, hardly anyone had any confidence in scientific evi
dence. "[S]killed testimony, which ought to be the most decisive and
8
convincing of them all, [was] of all the most suspicious and unsatisfactory."
Many lawyers today know about the problem of conflicting experts and
the "battle of the experts" problem through a famous 1 90 1 article by
Learned Hand: how can we expect jurors to decide between experts when
the jurors' ignorance is the premise for allowing the expert to testify in the
9
first place? As Golan shows, however, before 1 90 1 the dilemma was al
ready old news (pp. 88, 1 39-40). And as modern commentators know, it has
been a consistent refrain (or, perhaps less charitably, a broken record) ever
since. IO Lay decisionmakers, of course, ultimately must rely on proxies like
11
appearance, demeanor, and language to determine an expert's reliability,
occasionally leading to spectacular blunders. Back in 1 859, jurors were
fooled into believing the validity of a test for poison (p. 102). Fast forward
ing to the present, in the oft-quoted 1 985 bench trial of Wells ex rel.
1
Maihafer v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 2 the judge was fooled into believ
ing that spermicides caused birth defects. As Sam Gross dryly notes, despite
being "a first rate specimen of judicial craft" the Wells decision was " abso
13
lutely wrong." No scientific evidence (including a comprehensive review
14
by the FDA) ever linked spermicides to birth defects. The medical com
16
15
munity had a conniption; the press had a field day.

8.

P. 105

(quoting a January 1862 Saturday Review).

9. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expen Testimony, 15
H ARV. L. REv. 40, 54 (190 I) ("[H]ow can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon
an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for
such a task that the expert is necessary at all.").
10. See, e.g., Lee M. Friedman, Expen Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J.
247, 249 (1909) (describing the problem of conflicting testimony, often given by unscrupulous
experts, and its ability to confuse jurors); William A. Wick & Erle A. Kightlinger, Impanial Medical
Testimony Under the Federal Civil Rules: A Tale of Three Doctors, 34 INS. CouNs. J. 115, 117
(1967) (noting that jurors confronted with conflicting medical testimony may often choose "the best
witness, rather than the best doctor").
11. Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast Implant
Litigation, 8 PsYCHOL. Pue. PoL'Y & L. 154, 158 (2002) (describing a 1983 study concluding that
jurors use an expert's appearance and "paralanguage" as proxies for reliability).
12.

615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

13. Samuel R. Gross, Expen Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1122. But see Joseph L.
Gastwirth, The Need for Careful Evaluation of Epidemiological Evidence in Product Liability
Cases: A Reexamination of Wells v. Ortho and Key Pharmaceuticals, 2 L AW, PROBABILITY & RISK
151, 18(µ!5 (2003) (arguing that given the specific facts of the case and the studies offered at the
time by the parties, the Wells decision may be undeservedly vilified in the literature).
14. Michael B. Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and Poor Reproductive Outcomes: The
Epidemiologic Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 552
(1985).
15. See, e.g., James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and "Litogens", 315 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1984).
16.

See, e. g., Editorial, Federa/Judges v. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1986, at A22.
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T he bias or dishonesty concern is al so alive and well today. Federal Ju
dicial Center surveys in both 199 1 and 1998 showed that federal district
court judges thought the most common problem with expert testimony was
experts " who 'abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that
hired them.' "17 T he "scientist as prostitute" was the moving force behind
18
Peter Huber's crusade against "junk science" in the 1980s. And recent
revelations that forensic scientists fabricated results are related (although
19
more extreme) examples of this phenomenon in the criminal context.
T hat the problems surrounding adversarial experts have stayed with us
for over two hundred years should be entirely unremarkable. T he methods
of presenting expert knowledge are fundamentally the same today as they
were in 1783, and the system's structure breeds these pathologies. If any
thing, the system's attributes have gotten worse. Experts are now paid
handsomely for their services, and their future marketability is influenced
by their parties' success. Experts also spend considerable time preparing and
rehearsing with their attorney-employers and worrying about the opposing
20
side's cross-examination. It is no small wonder then that even a scrupulous
expert will shade his testimony in his party's favor. At the same time, ju
rors--carefully culled to ensure an utter lack of scientific expertise-must
21
absorb complex scientific principles presented orally, and they must then
choose between conflicting experts. T he results are predictably far from
desirable.
C . Solutions Then, Solutions Now
Persistent problems are understandable-after all, some problems are
just hard to solve. W hat is more worrisome, however, is that even the solu
tions appear to be recurring. In a terrific chapter chronicling the nineteenth
century debates on scientific evidence in England and the United States,
Golan depicts distraught scientists and lawyers searching for a cure (pp.
120, 140). By 1 860, there was a general feeling in England that the "crisis
[in expert evidence] had reached intolerable proportions," and that the prob
lem stemmed from improper legal procedures or institutions (pp. 1 20-21).
At the same time, " [t]he reform of expert testimony became one of the hot
test topics in the meetings of the various bar associations that mushroomed

17.

MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL

CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5

18.
(1991).

P ETER

(2000).

W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 17-20

19. Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 381, 399-406 (2004).
20.

Gross,

supra note 13, at 1138-39.

21. See David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door; Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the F uture of Scientific Evi
dence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1799, 1821 (1994) ("Indeed, judicial assessment of validity might be
better conducted through written briefs rather than oral testimony.").
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in late-nineteenth-century America" (p. 140). Proposals for reform
abounded.
Golan recounts an amazing series of lectures in 1860 at the Royal Soci
ety of Arts in England in which members laid out, for all intents and
purposes, what many will recognize as the modem corpus of scientific evi
dence reforms. Chemist Robert Angus Smith proposed the use of
independent experts and a move toward written rather than oral expert tes
timony (pp. 111-13). He and Professor Alfred Swaine Taylor, whom Golan
describes as "the most sought after scientific witness in Britain," also advo
cated for scientific advisors who could help judges better understand the
scientific material and keep witnesses honest (pp. 112, 115-16). Edwin
Chadwick advocated for " scientific tribunals," to which courts could offi
22
cially refer cases for comment (p. 113). Opponents (mainly lawyers)
argued that experts often had legitimate differences of opinion or that the
system was already as good as possible. To them, the reforms were therefore
unnecessary (pp. 114-16). A generation later, the same debate reemerged in
two sparring English scientific journals, one mundanely entitled Chemical
News, the other more curiously named The Journal of Gas Lighting, Water
Supply, & Sanitary Improvement (pp. 129-35). Identical proposals surfaced
across the Atlantic, provoking similar naysayers. 23
These proposals for court-appointed experts, scientific tribunals, and the
like, however, were not unique to the nineteenth-century. Indeed, combining
portions of Golan's book with the subsequent scientific evidence literature
reveals that these ideas have been regularly recycled and unsuccessfully at
tempted over the last 150 years.24

1. Court-Appointed Experts
Court-appointed expert witnesses are one of the oldest and most popular
25
proposed solutions to the problem of the biased or dishonest expert. The

22. P. 120 (noting that almost every scientific commentator from Victorian England seemed
to support neutral experts and scientific advisors).
23. Pp. 135-36, 140. For example, in a posthumous 1897 Harvard Law Review article, Judge
William Foster argued that conflicting experts were beneficial because they generated additional
investigation. William L. Foster, Expen Testimony,-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies,
11 HARV. L. REV. 169, 179 (1897), cited in p.140 n.65. Judge Foster further argued that the prob
lems with expert testimony were exaggerated and would not be cured by any of the proposals. Thus,
"it [was] best to 'let well enough alone.' " Id. at 185.
24.

See, e.g., WILLARD BARTLETT, N.Y. STATE MED. Ass'N, MEDICAL EXPERT EVIDENCE:
(1899) (arguing that to com
bat junk science, courts should appoint independent experts, technical advisors, and members of
consulting panels); Peter J. Goss et al., Clearing Away the Junk: Coun-Appointed Expens, Scientifi
cally Marginal Evidence, and the Silicone Gel Breast Implant litigation, 56 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 227,
227 (2001) (discussing the three commonly proposed reforms); Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and
Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1083-84 (1966) (same).
THE OBSTACLES TO RADICAL CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM 10-11

25. Gross, supra note 13, at 1189 (noting that court-appointed experts have been suggested
for over a century); Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical
Survey of the Use of Expen Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 156 (1995) (remarking that court
appointed expert proposals are "as old as the American republic").

1394

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.104:1387

proposal has natural appeal . To the extent that the problems of expert testi
mony are caused by partisanship and financial interest, insulating experts
from party influence makes sense .
Perhaps as a result, court-appointed expert proposals have enjoyed a
good deal of traction. Nearly every scientist-commentator in V ictorian Eng
26
land supported them, and legal commentators have regularly discussed and
27
advocated for their use ever since. At the beginning of the twentieth cen
tury, Michigan and Rhode Island passed limited bills allowing the use of
8
29
neutral experts, 2 and California introduced similar legislation. By mid
century, both the Model Code of Evidence and the Model Expert Testimony
30
Act included provisions for court-appointed witnesses. Ultimately, court
appointed experts found their way into Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and
31
today, over thirty states have adopted Rule 706. Even Justice Breyer, in his
32
concurrence to General Electric Co. v. Joiner, famously advocated for the
.
33
use of court-appomte d experts.
Unfortunately, court-appointed experts have been far from a triumph in
practice . As David Kaye notes, " [n]ow, as then," court-appointed experts are
34
often proposed as a solution but are almost never used. A Federal Judicial
Center survey published in 1994 showed that, despite having clear authority
26. P. 120; see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (reporting that between 1820 and the
1850s, doctors increasingly supported "nonadversarial methods of gathering expert medical opin
ion").
E.g. , 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI
563, at 966 (2d ed. 1923), discussed in Gross, supra note 13,
at 1189; F. Hastings Griffin, Jr., Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Lawyer in Favor, 34 TEMP.
L.Q. 402, 405-15 (1961); Clemens Herschel, Services of Experts in the Conduct of Judicial Inquir
ies, 21 AM. L. REV. 571, 577 (1887); Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 AM. L. REV. 45, 61
(1867); Wick & K ightlinger, supra note 10, at 117; Note, Expert Testimony, 5 AM. L. REv. 428,
441-42 (1870); Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of
Two Models, 32 IND. L. REv. 225, 234 (1998); see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 144 (describing
a very early proposal by T.R. Beck, writer of the treatise Elements of Medical Jurisprudence, in
1823). For comprehensive lists of previous proposals for court-appointed experts, see DAVID H.
KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, Expert Evidence§ 10.4.1, at 347-48
nn.3-5 (2004), and Gross, supra note 13, at 1116 n.8.
27.

DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON L AW §

28. Friedman, supra note 10, at 249-50 (describing the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes).
Michigan's statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional because it infringed on the executive's
power to call witnesses in criminal cases. P. 257; People v. Dickerson, 129 N.W. 198 (Mich. 1910);
Note, Appointment of Expert Wimesses by the Court, 24 HARV. L. REv. 483, 483-84 (1911).
29. A.M. Kidd, The Proposed Expert Evidence Bill, 3 CAL. L. REv. 216, 218 (1914) (de
scribing proposed court-appointed expert legislation in California); see also KAYE ET AL., supra
note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348 n.4 (citing a proposal by the New York Bar Association in 1909).
30. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 430-31 (1952) (noting that both
provisions permitted court-appointed experts to co-exist with traditional adversarial experts). The
Model Expert Testimony Act provision was subsequently endorsed by the ABA Committee on the
Improvement of the Law of Evidence. Gross, supra note 13, at 1189.
31. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 706(04) (1988), cited in Gross, supra note 13, at 1189-90.
32.

522 U.S. 136 (1997).

33.

Id. at 147, 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).

34.
KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348; see also Gross, supra note 13, at 1191;
Worthington et al., supra note 11, at 162 (noting that judges rarely appoint experts).
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to do so, 80 percent of federal district court judges have never appointed an
35
expert.
Moreover, mechanisms to facilitate neutral experts have historically
been non-starters, often due to judicial apathy or outside resistance. To help
judges locate and select experts, scientific, medical, and legal associations
36
have attempted from time to time to set up pre-approved lists of experts.
Golan, for example, discusses proposals from bar associations to establish
37
official lists in the mid-nineteenth century. T hese attempts fell flat. At
tempts were also made in Massachusetts and elsewhere to establish such
39
38
panels in the 1 880s and again around 1 9 10 -all were rejected by state
legislatures.
In the 1 950s, renewed efforts succeeded in establishing official medical
40
41
42
expert lists in New York C ity, New Jersey, Baltimore, Miami, Cleveland,
Los Angeles, and the federal district courts for the Western and Eastern Dis
43
tricts of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Illinois. Some early
reviews seemed genuinely positive: judges found an increase in testimony
44
quality and a decrease in conflicting evidence. Ultimately, however, all of the
45
programs faded away, victims of neglect. Even the most famous instance,

35. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Expens in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994).
36. See id. at 1022 (noting judicial complaints about the difficulty of locating appropriate
experts); Gross, supra note 13, at 1191 (observing that one barrier to court-appointed experts is the
difficulty of finding experts).
37. P. 140; see also Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (reporting significant discussions in
mid-nineteenth century medical journals on having panels of experts).
38.

Landsman, supra note 25, at 146 (citing JAMES c. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW:
(1993)).

MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 211

39.

Friedman, supra note 10, at 250.

40.

SPECIAL

COMM. ON THE MED. EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
(1956).

CITY OF NEW YORK, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY

41. Gross, supra note 13, at 1192 (citing Theodore I. Bouer, T he Coun-Appointed lmpanial
Expen, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES, 57, 62 n.17 (Melvin D. Kraft ed., 1977)).
42. Elwood S. Levy, lmpanial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 417
(1961) (describing the establishment of the Baltimore Project in 1955 under Emory H. Niles, Chief
Judge of the Supreme Bench).
43. See Francis L. Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expen System: The Judicial Point of
View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 390 n.12 (1961) (reporting the rule in 1959 allowing panels in the North
ern District of Illinois); Henry Menin & Gary Charles Leedes, Note, The Present Status of the
lmpanial Medical Expen in Civil Litigation, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 476, 476-77 (1961) (conducting survey
that showed plans in effect in Miami, Cleveland, Baltimore, and Los Angeles, and in the federal
courts for the Western and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania). All of the plans appeared to have
standing panels except for Cleveland's, in which courts made requests to the Academy of Medicine
in Cleveland. Menin & Leedes, supra, at 480-81 & n.35.
44. David W. Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Way to Better and Quicker Justice, 22
F.R.D. 21, 24, 24-25 (1958) (reporting that judges and lawyers in New York project cases were
pleased with results); Van Dusen, supra note 43, at 394 (reporting results from the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania).

45. Gross, supra note 13, at 1192 (reporting that the New Jersey project was only used six
times a year from 1961 to 1975, and that the Los Angeles project was not used at all from 1966 to
1967).
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46
the New York Medical Expert Testimony Project, so promising at first,
47
never really caught on. In the end, only 3 to 6 percent of the applicable
personal injury trials took advantage of the project, and "[b]y 1 976, the pro
48
ject had fallen into general disuse."
Today, the list concept has once again resurfaced. For example, until it
recently closed in 2003, the Private Adjudication Center at Duke University
School of Law maintained a Registry of Independent Scientific and Techni
50
49
cal Advisors. T he American Association for the Advancement of Science
has also established the Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE) pro
gram, which has been matching interested judges with vetted scientific
51
experts since 200 1 . T he latest embodiment of the recurring theme, CASE
52
has been endorsed by Justice Breyer and the House Committee on Science,
but if history is any indication, it too faces an uphill battle.
2. Scientific Tribunals and Expert Juries
A related but distinct proposal focuses on using scientific tribunals or
53
other types of expert decisionmakers. Concerned about jury ignorance?
54
Replace the lay jury with an expert one. As Golan notes, expert juries have
55
an ancient lineage at common law. "Trade disputes" often involved juries
of "goldsmiths, booksellers, wine merchants, attorneys, and fishmongers,"
particularly when the jury had to decide if guild regulations had been vio-

46. Peck, supra note 44, at 24 (reporting that the New York project had processed 575 cases
by 1958, with 330 settled at pre-trial, 62 settled at trial, and 68 tried). The New York project was
established in December 1952. Note, The New York Medical Expen Project: An Experiment in Se
curing Impanial Testimony, 63 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023-24 (1954).
47.

Gross, supra note 13, at 1192.

48.

Id.

49. See Joe S. Cecil, Construing Science in the Quest for "Ipse Dixit": A Comment on Sand
ers and Cohen, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 971 & nn.17 & 19 (2003) (discussing the use of the
Duke registry in Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003)). The Private
Adjudication Center effectively closed in 2003, in part due to funding issues. See Open Letter from
Professor Thomas B. Metzloff and Cheryl J. Zielsdorf (July 17, 2003) (on file with author).
50. CASE technically operates under the auspices of the National Conference of Lawyers
and Scientists, a joint committee of AAAS and the American Bar Association Science and Technol
ogy Section. See American Association for the Advancement of Science, CASE Mainpage,
http://www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.
KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.1, at 348 n.6 (describing expert decisionmakers as a
"variation[] on [the] theme" of court-appointed experts).
54. See James Oldham, The History of the Special (Strock) Jury in the United States and Its
Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Chal
lenges, 6 WM. & MAR Y BILL RTS. J. 623, 655 (1998) ("The notion of bringing experts into dispute
settlement processes makes good common sense and has an extensive history.").
55. Pp. 18-19. See generally James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI.
L. REv. 137 ( 1983) (providing a history of special juries until the mid-eighteenth century).
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56
lated. Special juries were also used in cases involving foreigners and other
special groups including "Jews (but not gypsies), Welshmen (but not Scots),
57
clerics, university scholars, merchants, and other guild members," and
58
cases involving claims of pregnancy. Even Lord Mansfield used merchant
jurors in commerce cases to develop the commercial law for which he be
59
came famous. By the t ime of the great scientific evidence debates of the
mid- 1 800s, however, expert juries had vanished (p. 20).
Expert jury proposals soon reemerged. As Golan reports, in 1 862, a con
cerned British Association for the Advancement of Science ("BAAS")
proposed abolishing the jury in technical cases and replacing it with a judge
and "up to three skilled assessors" (pp. 12 1-22). Although initially thought
infeasible due to English jury traditions (p. 122), a BAAS-related reform
eventually won out. Golan notes that the expert evidence problem subsided
in England after the late nineteenth century as technical trials were diverted
from the jury (pp. 1 38 , 1 43).
We can readily enrich Golan's discussion with parallels from across the
Atlantic. At the time of the Founding, U.S. courts also used special juries.
Merchant juries were prevalent in late-eighteenth-century New York and
61
60
South Carolina, and in antebellum Louisiana. Merchant juries similarly
62
disappeared in New Y ork and South Carolina circa 1 800. L ouisiana per
sisted, but its use of merchant juries quickly declined after the abolition of
63
its Commercial Court in 1 846.
Of course, U.S. courts did not adopt British-type jury reforms in the late
1 800s (pp. 138- 39), nor have they since, for the Seventh Amendment and its
state counterparts have always presented formidable obstacles. In the late
1970s, legal historians Patrick Devlin and Morris Arnold, among others,
c lashed over whether the Seventh Amendment extended to complex civil

56. P. 19; see Hand, supra note 9, at 41-42 (noting that expert juries were common in Lon
don in the fourteenth century for trade disputes); Oldham, supra note 55, at 174 (describing a 1394
jury of "cooks and fishmongers, where one was accused of selling bad food" (quoting JAMES BRAD
LEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON L AW 94 & n.4 (1898)); id.
(describing a libel trial in which the defendant requested jurors from the publishing industry).
57. P. 19. These groups were entitled to special juries "of the half tongue," in which half of
the jurors belonged to the defendant's group. Id.
58. P. 19. Pregnant women could "plead the belly," thereby obtaining a reprieve during preg
nancy. All-female juries of matrons were used as investigators in these cases. See Oldham, supra
note 55, at 171-72.
59. P. 2 1; Oldham, supra note 55, at 173 (noting that merchant juries "existed long before
Lord Mansfield").
60. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780- 1860, at 155-58
( 1977), discussed in Oldham, supra note 54, at 642-43.
61.

Oldham, supra note 54, at 657-58.

62. HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 157-59 (noting disappearance of merchant juries in New
York after 1807 and South Carolina after 1 797).
63. Oldham, supra note 54, at 658 (noting that until then, the Louisiana court was the "clos
est approximation in the United States to Lord Mansfield's use of merchant juries to incorporate
mercantile practices into the common law").
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64
cases. By and large, this most recent attempt to abolish juries in complex
65
cases failed. Arguably the only remnant is a curious Delaware statute au
66
thorizing the use of special juries in complex cases, and this statute has
fared no better than its court-appointed expert counterparts. Requests for
special juries under the Delaware provision are frequently denied for lack of
sufficient complexity, with some judges appearing hostile to the whole con
67
cept. Indeed, the few special jury statutes that remain on the books are
68
generally neglected or dispar aged by courts. Even when a court offers to
empanel a special jury, as Judge Rubin did in the Bendectin multidistrict
69
litigation, the parties generally decline.
An alternative path around these roadblocks is to empanel scientific ad
visory tribunals to help jurors or judges. Early commentators, including
70
Learned Hand, proposed just that. Variants of this reform have been much
discussed lately, particularly in the wake of the silicone breast implant liti
gation. As part of the breast implant multidistrict litigation, Judge Pointer
established a N ational Science Panel of court-appointed experts under Rule
64.
Compare Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of
the Seventh Amendment, 80 COL UM. L. REV. 43, 65-77 (1980) (arguing that juries were not histori
cally used in complex equity cases), with Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 848 (1980) (arguing that there
"seems to be no good historical foundation for the argument that plaintiffs may be denied the right
to a jury trial because their cases are complex"). For citations to the extensive literature in this de
bate, see Oldham, supra note 55, at 138 n.5.
65.
Oldham, supra note 54, at 655-56 & n.204 (arguing, however, that the decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 ( 1996), may have made inroads on the jury
right in patent cases).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (2005) ('The Court may order a special jury upon the
application of any patty in a complex civil case."), noted in Oldham, supra note 54, at 634; In re
Asbestos Litigation, 551 A.2d 1296 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (upholding constitutionality of statute).
67. See Bradley v. AC. & S. Co., 1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989) (rejecting
a special jury motion because most science can be explained to ordinary jurors and expressing con
cerns that special jurors might have preconceived ideas); Oldham, supra note 54, at 659 (noting the
resistance of superior court judges to special juries). Oldham notes that special juries are used occa
sionally in Delaware nevertheless. Oldham, supra note 54, at 661--62 (citing McLain v. General
Motors Corp., 569 A.2d 579 (Del. 1990), and Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 1987 WL
283 11 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987)).
·

68. E.g., Oldham, supra note 54, at 641-42 (discussing Schuster v. City of New York, 205
N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1960), in which the judge denied the special jury request and "expressed his
strong distaste for the elitist nature of 'blue ribbon' juries"). See generally id. at 633-41 (reporting
states with special jury statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, New York, Vir
ginia, West Virginia; and states with them under common law: Alaska and Hawaii). Judicial hostility
is no small wonder, given that special juries were historically often fueled by elitist or racist senti
ments. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48
DEPAUL L. REv. 201, 216 (1998) ('The whole concept of a 'blue-ribbon' jury is suspect today-and
for good reason.").
69. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1217
(S.D. Ohio 1985). As Judge Rubin acknowledged, blue-ribbon juries are not recognized under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, "[o]nly by agreement of all parties could [a blue-ribbon
jury] have been used." Id. at 1217; see also Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testi
mony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 81 (1993) (discussing blue-ribbon
juries).
70. Hand, supra note 9, at 56-57; see also Note, Expen Testimony in Judicial Proceedings, 9
ALB. L.J. 122, 122 (1874) (advocating for a similar proposal).
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71
706 to assess substantive causation issues. Somewhat differently, Judge
Jones of the District of Oregon used a panel of technical advisors to help the
72
court assess its breast-implant-related Daubert issues. Promising solu
tions? Certainly. But despite having percolated for over a century, expert
tribunals continue to be the exception rather than the rule.
3. Self-Regulation
One last reform worth mentioning is having professional societies police
their own members. As Golan describes, some early twentieth-century re
formers, conceding the inviolability of the jury, pinned their hopes on self
73
regulation by the professions. For example, in 1 9 10, the great hope was
74
that codes of ethics would encourage more scrupulous expert testimony.
Consistently clever, Golan even links Frye's "general acceptance" standard
to attempts to use professional associations as a regulatory mechanism (p.
258).
Here too, further inquiry reveals self-regulation to be a recurring reform.
The idea reappeared in Minnesota in the 1 940s, when physicians tried to
75
make biased testimony a violation of ethics rules. Most recently, the
American Medical Association has taken the lead, encouraging licensing
76
boards to discipline members for unethical testimony.
Predictably, the reform has stalled. Recent studies show that only seven
out of thirty-six specialty organizations surveyed had clearly defined disci
77
plinary procedures for addressing unethical testimony. The vanguard of the
movement, the American Association of Neurological Surgeons ("AANS" ),
has conducted fifty investigations since 1 983, with only ten resulting in dis
78
cipline.
71. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the appointment of a National Science Panel in the multidistrict phase of the silicone
breast implant litigation); Goss et al, supra note 24, at 238-39; Barbara S. Hulka et al., Experience
of a Scientific Panel Formed to Advise the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 812, 812-14 (2000) (discussing procedures used by the Pointer panel).
72.

Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-94 (D. Or. 1996).

73. P. 257; see also BARTLETT, supra note 24, at 16-17, 22-23 (arguing that medical asso
ciations should regulate medical experts through ethics rules, and that these internal reforms would
be ideal because they would not interfere with "existing rules of judicial procedure"); Friedman,
supra note 10, at 256 (arguing for professional standards for experts as the only practical solution).
74. P. 258. But see KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359 (noting that professional
ethics codes often have provisions on expert testimony, but that these provisions are largely aspira
tional).
75. Menin & Leedes, supra note 43, at 478 (noting that such provisions were difficult to
enforce).
76. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359 n.60 (citing Amer. Med.I Ass'n Policy
Statements H-265.993 and H-265.992).
77. Aubrey Milunsky, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Experts: T he Abrogation of Respon
sibility by Specialty Organizations and a Call for Action, 18 J. CHILD NEUROLOGY 413, 416 (2003).
78. KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 359-60. The Seventh Circuit upheld AANS's
disciplinary practices in 2001. Austin v. Amer. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 97374 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) ("More policing of expert witnessing is required, not less.").
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Even if successful, these reforms seem ill-conceived---o r at minimum,
incomplete-and not just because of the adage that self-regulation means no
regulation. Typical scientists, as unlicensed professionals, simply do not
have professional societies strong enough to give their ethical codes teeth.
At the same time, self-policing by doctors and other more organized profes
sional groups will inevitably yield perverse results. Exactly who files
disciplinary charges? Judges, lawyers, and the general public cannot-they
are precluded under a self-regulation scheme. Opposing experts in typical
slip-and-fall cases will not-few if any will waste valuable time and energy
filing grievances. The primary movers under a self-regulation regime will be
the doctor-defendants sued for malpractice, hoping to chill plaintiff s' ex
79
perts. Indeed, in twenty years, all but one of the AANS claims have been
80
filed against plaintiff s ' experts.
D. The Big Question
So the big question raised by Laws of Men and Laws of Nature is this:
are we in fact spinning our wheels? Is this latest feverish round of scientific
evidence debates and proposals just another iteration of a seemingly endless
(and pointless) cycle?
Over a century ago, Justice Willard Bartlett of New York remarked that
many medical expert reforms had already been proposed, but none had
81
"been carried into effect ." The reason, Justice Bartlett suggested, was op
82
position from the bar and the adversarial and jury traditions of the country.
Golan's account concurs (pp. 140, 256). Proposals for abolishing the jury or
instituting special tribunals infringe on the jury tradition, and independent
experts infringe on the adversarial system and its peculiar view of court neu
trality (p. 256). Consequently, while the end of the nineteenth century
teemed with solutions, none were actually helpful (p. 256). Judges and leg
islatures were reluctant to toy with the adversarial system (p. 140).
And so it has been in the ensuing years. For example, while a few bar
associations supported official expert lists, many opposed them. The Mary
land Bar Association and the Baltimore City Bar Association came out
against the B altimore Project, and the Medico-Legal Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association opposed the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's
83
plan.
More recently, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
("ATLA" ) has vehemently opposed the CASE project, arguing that there is
no need for court-appointed experts, that neutral experts do not exist, and
that CASE would undermine "the adversarial process that has stood at the

79.

Austin, 253 F.3d at 972-73.

80.

KAYE ET AL., supra note 27, § 10.4.2, at 361.

81.

BARTLETT, supra note 24, at 3.

82.

Id. at 12, 15-16.

83.

Levy, supra note 42, at 419.
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heart of the Anglo-Saxon judicial system for more thai1 eight hundred
84
years."
Modern commentators concur with this explanation. Sam Gross has ar
gued that the neglect of court-appointed experts today is in large part due to
85
trial bar opposition and an adversarially focused judicial outlook. Stephan
Landsman similarly predicts that reform proposal s will not "replace more
adversarial mechanisms any time soon" because they "strengthen already
too powerful professional establishments and their inquisitorial essence is
86
ill-fitted to . . . adversarial expectations."
As Golan rightly comments, to fix the expert testimony problem, some
thing must yield in the " sacred triangulation of the adversarial system-the
political postulate of the lay jury, the traditional right of the parties to fur
nish all evidence, or the neutral position of the court" (pp. 256-57). England
addressed its problem by sacrificing juries (p. 1 38). The Seventh Amend
ment sternly informs us that no such thing is happening here. As an
ideological institution of liberty and a bulwark of Jacksonian democracy, the
lay jury carries too much baggage in the United States (p. 1 39).
So is there any hope? One possibility may be Daubert itself, whose true
87
import is not its oft-quoted four-factor test but rather the shift in judicial
88 Since Daubert, judges have increasingly em
thinking that it promotes.
braced their role as scientific gatekeepers, seriously inserting themselves
into the process of receiving expert evidence perhaps for the first time in
history. To be sure, Golan notes that courts have turned to evidence law in
the past: the ultimate issue rule, the requirement of hypothetical questions
for experts, and the hearsay doctrine were all nineteenth-century attempts to
rein in experts (pp. 140-43). E ven Frye itself supported this effort by half
heartedly requiring judges to police expert evidence (pp. 25 8, 263...:()4 ). Yet I
surmise that the post-Daubert world may be different. Judges under Daube rt
grapple substantively with science, forcing the good ones to inform them
selves about scientific concepts and methods, and placing pressure on their
traditionally passive mien. No longer can they count heads or hide behind
arcane and formalistic evidence rules. The more judges take active roles, the
89
weaker adversarial norms will become. This transformative potential of
Daubert, coupled with the modern willingness to accept the role of the

84. Lisa Gelhaus, A Case Against CASE, TRIAL, Aug. 1999, at 11, 13 (quoting ATLA position paper (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85.

Gross, supra note 13, at 1197-98.

86.

Landsman, supra note 25, at 156.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (falsifiability, peer re
87.
view, standards and error rates, and general acceptance).
88. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005).
89. Id. (characterizing Daubert as a move toward ·�udicial management" to reduce court
costs and arguing that the trend will continue).
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90
managerial judge, may encourage a greater degree of inquisitorial thinking,
opening the door to institutions like court-appointed experts and scientific
tribunals.
***

The observant reader will note that in writing this review, I have seem
ingly skipped the last third of Golan's book, the part dealing with blood
microscopy, x-rays, and lie detectors. This neglect should not be interpreted
as passive criticism, but rather a function of available space. Indeed, the
chapters are filled with other worthwhile accounts of the interplay between
law and science, in which one can see parallels to other modem scientific
evidence issues as well: blood microscopy to the problem of unresolved
scientific questions (p. 1 72), x-rays to recent debates over videotape and
computer evidence (p. 209), and lie detectors to the future possibility of us
91
ing brain mapping (pp. 248--49).
***

Professor Golan has produced an important work, a long-overdue his
torical addition to the scientific evidence literature. It is a must-read, not
only for scientific evidence scholars, but also for anyone seeking a richer
understanding of the continuing and frustrating conflicts between law and
science. In his well-known book, Mirjan Damaska paints a sunny future for
scientific evidence, arguing that science in the courtroom will cause a shift
92
toward special juries, court-appointed experts, and the like. After reading
Laws of Men and Laws of Nature, I am admittedly less sanguine, but I re
main hopeful, for Daubert may be · just the new beginning that scientific
evidence has been waiting for.

90.
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 128 1 (1976) (discussing the new judicial managerial role); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 H ARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (same).
9 1.
See Robin M arantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006 (Magazine), at
47 (describing the latest generation of polygraphs).
92.

M IRJ AN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143-52 (1997).

